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1. Introduction  
 
At present, there is a great deal of confusion regarding complexity and its 
measures (reviews on complexity measures are found in, e.g. Lloyd, 2001 and 
Shalizi, 2006 and more references therein). Moreover, there is also confusion 
regarding the nature of life. In this situation, it seems the task of determining  
the fundamental complexity measures of life is especially difficult. Yet this  
task is just part of a greater task: obtaining substantial insights into the nature  
of biological evolution. We think that without a firm quantitative basis 
characterizing the most fundamental aspects of life, it is impossible to overcome 
the confusion so as to clarify the nature of biological evolution. The approach 
we present here offers such quantitative measures of complexity characterizing 
biological organization and, as we will see, evolution.  
 
Fortunately, some important complexity measures are already established. Two 
such fundamental complexity measures are the algorithmic complexity of the 
human brain and the genetic complexity of the human organism. Let us consider 
how they are obtained. 
 
The complexity measure C of a system consisting from N elements can be 
characterized by the number of distinctive connections (not including replicas) 
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between the elements C = Ncd where cd is the average number of distinctive 
connections per element (Denbigh, 1975, 99). The term ‘distinctive’ is 
necessary, because an airplane is more complex than a watch, but a hundred 
watches of the same kind are not more complex than a single watch. The 
complexity measure is stated in terms of information units that estimate the 
information content i of one element (having an average number of connections) 
as I = Ci. On this basis, the brain’s complexity is usually considered in terms of 
neurons and synaptic connections, e.g. Stripling (2004). For a number of 
neurons Nneurons = 1011–1013 (Smith, 1997, 921), taking a value for the number of 
their interconnections as a few thousand per neuron cd ∼ 104 (Koch and Laurent, 
1999), we obtain for the measure of the brain’s complexity the number 
C1 = cNneurons = 1015–1017. We emphasize that the complexity measure C 
measures the number of (distinctive) interconnections, and so it is a 
dimensionless number that corresponds to objective reality. The general view 
assumes that a connection (synapse) represents i∼1 bits of information. In this 
way, we obtain for the information measure of the brain’s complexity a value of 
I1 = I (human brain) ∼ 1015–1017 bits. Now since algorithmic complexity may be 
characterized by the size of the memory, we obtain that I1 = Ialgorithmic(brain). 
 
Although it may seem that this estimation is overly simplified and evident, we 
point out a baffling problem that surfaces immediately when comparing 
Ialgorithmic(brain) with the genetic complexity of the whole human organism. 
Maynard Smith (2000) noted that the genetic information content of human 
DNA corresponds to “instructions,” and assigns a value of I2(DNA) ~ 109 bits to 
this information measure. (Notice that pure genetic complexity can be measured 
by a dimensionless number, characterized by the number of coding base pairs. 
See Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1995, 5). Now it is generally accepted that 
the DNA controls all the biochemical processes of the organism (e.g. Woski and 
Smith, 2002, 28). We point out that the comparison of these two firm complexity 
measures presents a fundamental paradox: How can it be that the genetic 
complexity of the human organism (including the brain) — I2 ~ 109 bits — is 
smaller than the algorithmic complexity of the human brain, I1 ~ 1015–1017 bits? 
We have to think that the organism as a whole has to be more complex than one 
of its parts, the brain1.  
                                                 
1Actually, a part of brain’s activity is governed by self-conscious activity. But its is easy 
to show that İ(self-conscious activity) < 100 bits s−1 (we cannot read more than a few 
pages per minute; Breuer, 1995), and so the information obtained by self-conscious 
activity during a lifetime I (self-conscious activity per lifetime) < 1011 bits dwarfs in 
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We propose that the solution of this brain–DNA paradox lies in the fact that 
genetic complexity is related to elementary instructions determining the 
organization of simple biochemical reactions of the cells, while algorithmic 
complexity corresponds to simple biochemical reactions organized together into 
cycles or units of reaction sequences. Genetic complexity controls all the 
biochemical reactions occurring in cells; and so the gross activity of the brain 
corresponds to a comparatively small subset of biochemical reactions only, 
which have a much lower level of complexity than that of the algorithmic 
complexity of the human brain. In this simple model, the brain works only on 
some special characteristics of neural cells, such as their firing. Therefore, the 
resolution of the brain–DNA paradox lies in the recognition that genetic 
complexity corresponds to a deeper level of complexity than the algorithmic 
complexity of the brain, corresponding to the memory of the neural network.  
 
We note that we are faced immediately with another fundamental problem. The 
DNA contains 109 bits of information in the sequence of the base pairs, and this 
is a static form of information. In comparison, the biochemical reactions of cells 
represent a dynamic flow of information corresponding to their selection, 
coordination, and timing. If DNA is static, it could not govern the continuously 
changing reactions. No machine can work without moving components. This is 
the DNA–dynamism paradox. It turns out that with the introduction of the two 
most firmly established biological complexity measures, we are faced with two 
paradoxes immediately. In this chapter, we will suggest a simple resolution of 
these paradoxes. 
 
 
2. Fundamental Complexity Measures of Life 
 
In mathematics, there are no numbers without mathematical rules determining 
their interactions. Actually, numbers and mathematical rules are fundamentally 
different entities. In the phenomenological aspect, the most fundamental entities 
are numbers, sets, and complex sets of sets. In geometry, the most fundamental 
entities are the point, the geometrical structure (circle, square, etc.), and complex 
structures comprised of structures of structures. In the organizational aspect, the 
most fundamental entities are relations, rules, and axioms.  
 
                                                                                                             
comparison to the information represented by the whole neural network I1 ~ 1015–1017 
bits. 
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We note that the point and the circle have not only different levels of 
complexity, but they also express different kinds of complexities. Any circle can 
be represented as consisting from an infinite number of points, and as the 
correspondence between the points. This idea can be formulated by a simple 
concept: A circle consists of a set of points in a plane that are equidistant from a 
single point which is the centre of the circle. If one were to assign one bit (one 
yes or no question and its answer) to one point, the information content of the 
circle would be infinite. In a world in which only points exist, the construction 
of a circle would require giving the position of the “next” point, consecutively; 
and so the circle would require an infinite number of yes or no questions and 
answers, and so an infinite number of bits.  
 
Actually, in the process of constructing the circle from points one by one, still 
one would need concepts representing deeper level complexities, such as 
“continuity” and “closed line,” which cannot be expressed directly in the 
language of points. Yet we recognize that the idea of the circle can be 
characterized by a deeper-level complexity — algorithmic complexity. The 
algorithmic complexity of a circle is a finite and small quantity. The distinction 
between the two levels of complexities of the circle — it’s phenomenal and 
algorithmic complexity — is fundamental.  
 
In physics, there are no elementary particles without laws of interaction. 
Elementary particles form structures, and complex structures of structures. Their 
interactions are described by physical laws. And all the fundamental laws of 
physical interactions can be derived from the least action principle.  
 
The next step towards finding quantitative measures of biological organization is 
to consider what a machine is. A machine is a special arrangement of service 
parts or components put together according to its blueprint. In the organizational 
aspect, the machine is made up by the assembly of its components, and by the 
realization of its blueprint, which determines the interactions between its 
components. The components have to be produced, and the instructions required 
to their production represent a type of algorithmic complexity: The blueprint 
determines the relation of the components to each other. Therefore, the specified 
complexity of the blueprint corresponds to a still deeper level of complexity than 
the complexity of the production of its components. A machine is governed by 
its blueprint. Yet not only the blueprint, but the components themselves are 
static, passive. In the phenomenological aspect, regarding their complexity 
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levels, machines consist of: a) particles, b) components, and c) components put 
together.  
 
In comparison, living organisms consist first of all of processes of biological 
interactions. Their complexity levels are a) simple biochemical reactions, b) 
biochemical cycles and units of reaction sequences, and, at their deepest 
organizational level, c) biological organization. Ultimately, living organisms are 
governed by genetic instructions determining which reactions and units of 
reaction sequences have to occur, and when and where. Genetic instructions 
change from one timestep to the next, and involve all the components of a living 
organism simultaneously. This is a fundamental difference between living 
organisms and machines.  
 
Living organisms are creative beings, as evolution, plants sciences and 
ethnology show. Regarding their physical level, living organisms can be 
compared to robots. Living organisms can behave in the next timestep as a new 
robot, a robot with a new function. They are able to invent new blueprints 
serving new, unforeseen tasks. Living organisms are dynamic at their deepest 
level of complexity. 
 
The difference between the machine and the living organism is like the 
difference between numbers and mathematical rules. The complexity of the 
machine is phenomenological, static, and passive; while that of the living 
organism is organizational, dynamic, and active.  
 
Let us approach the distinctions between machines and living organisms in  
light of the difference between physical “organization” (termed as “self-
organization”) and biological organization. As the root of the word 
“organization” (“organ”) tells, organization belongs to the realm of biology. 
Physical “organization” is present in the order of crystals, of magnets, of 
snowflakes patterns, of convection patterns, of reaction-diffusion patterns, etc. 
Physical “organization” represents actually not organizational, but ordering 
processes.  
 
Actually, ordering and organization are two fundamentally different processes 
(see e.g. Denbigh, 1975, 89-98; Elitzur, 1994). When starting from the living 
state, the larger is the order, the smaller is the organization, as shown when a 
living organism becomes frozen. In physical ordering, patterns of elements can 
be generated, and in man-made machines they follow prescribed rules. In living 
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organisms, biological organization generates new rules from time-step to time-
step. Biological processes are governed by complexity present in the boundary 
conditions of physical equations. In contrast, even the most complex physical 
orderings (like reaction-diffusion processes) are governed by physical 
equations, and their boundary conditions are simple. Actually, biological 
processes are governed by an extraordinarily complex system of time-dependent 
boundary conditions of the physical equations.  
 
Written sentences are composed of words, and words are composed of letters. 
Letters represent the fundamental elements or building blocks, corresponding  
to numbers in mathematics, and particles in physics. Words correspond  
to structures in mathematics, and patterns in physics. Sentences correspond to 
machines and organisms. One can compare the difference between machines and 
organisms to the difference between syntax and semantics. Machines follow the 
(once-for-all) established syntactical rules only, since physics does not deal with 
problems of meaning. Sentences written by a computer following merely the 
rules of syntax will form an incoherent sequence of sentences, most of which 
will be without any meaning. In contrast, when the sentences follow meaning, 
the result will be a poem, a novel, or a book on science: one single organism.  
 
A living organism follows the continuously changing internal and external 
contexts, and reacts to them on the basis of its own principle driving its 
biological organization towards the optimization of life’s conditions. Biological 
organization is like writing, while physical ordering is mechanical repetition of 
words following merely syntactical rules, if any. It is these syntactical rules that 
represent algorithmic complexity. In contrast, the semiotic principles correspond 
to a deeper, principal level of complexity. This is why machines cannot rebuild 
themselves from time-step to time-step. At the same time, this is the most 
fundamental property of organisms. 
 
Denbigh (1975, 96-97) emphasizes that “one cannot speak of an entity as being 
organized without at once raising the question: What is it organized for? (…) A 
machine is not explainable by the laws of physics and chemistry (even though 
the material of which it is composed obeys these laws); machines have always to 
be understood in terms of their own specific operational principles laid down by 
those who design them.” 
 
The chemical reactions within living organisms are mostly organized into cycles 
and units of reaction sequences and thus represent instances of algorithmic 
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complexity. Genetic instructions elicit the proper cycle and unit of reaction 
sequences at the proper place and time. They correspond to a deeper level of 
complexity than the algorithmic complexity of biochemical cycles and units of 
reaction sequences. The ultimate level of biological organization occurs at the 
genetic level. Genetic complexity characterizes a deeper level of complexity 
than algorithmic complexity. In every timestep, biological organization switches 
into new algorithms and new contexts. The new perspectives are determined by 
the new internal and external factors. 
 
Ontologically, there are three fundamental levels of complexity corresponding to 
the fundamental levels of existence. We observe by our outer senses the 
phenomenal world W0. W0 is governed by the laws of Nature, corresponding to 
a deeper ontological level we shall call the ‘level of laws’ or ‘lawlike level’ — 
W1. The laws of Nature do not represent the ultimate level of existence, for they 
are derived from first principles like the action principle of physics and the 
Bauer principle (Bauer, 1935/1967, 51) of biology. By the term “first principle” 
we mean a principle from which all the fundamental laws of natural sciences 
(physics, biology, and psychology) can be derived. Therefore, it appears only 
three first principles are necessary in the natural sciences: one in physics (this is 
the action principle), one in biology (this is the Bauer principle; Bauer, 
1935/1967), and one in psychology (formulated by Grandpierre, 2005, 76-102).  
 
The Bauer principle states that “The living and only the living systems are never 
in equilibrium and they continuously invest work from their free energy 
resources against the equilibrium that should be reached on the basis of the 
given initial state and the physico-chemical laws.” Thus the first principle of 
biology acts to generate consecutively the initial and boundary conditions that 
will be the input elements of the physical equations in the next timestep, which 
in turn correspond to evolving elementary biochemical reactions within the 
cells. Therefore the phenomenal–algorithmic–genetic complexities correspond 
to the phenomenal–lawlike–principal ontological levels. These three ontological 
levels correspond to three complexity levels. We note that the three levels of 
complexity as interpreted here show a certain similarity to Maynard Smith’s 
(2000) three complexity levels: the morphological, the selection, and the genetic 
level. 
 
Denbigh (1975, 93) notes that biological organization is basically “the 
organization of chemical processes each taking place continuously”. Now let us 
estimate the complexity of biological organization of the human organism as 
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expressed in elementary biochemical processes realized within cells. Certainly, 
the number of chemical reactions per second is larger than the number of ATP 
molecules produced per second. Kornberg (1989, 65) determined that the 
average daily intake of about 2500 kcal, corresponding to approximately 100 W, 
translates into a turnover of a whopping 180 kg of ATP. This number translates 
into N2 = NATP (organism) ∼ 2×1021 ATP molecule production per second in the 
human body, or 4x107 ATP molecule production per cell per second. Regarding 
the fact that ATP is produced in a chain of electron transfer events, and acts 
through energy coupling that involves the coupling of two reactions occurring at 
the same time, at the same place, typically utilizing the same enzyme complex, 
we find it plausible to assume that the rate of ATP production of NATP (organism) 
∼ 2×1021 reactions per second is smaller than the number of all chemical 
reactions of the human organism, N3 = Nreactions(organism) > 2×1021 chemical 
reactions per second. It is clear that both the production of each ATP molecule 
together with its reactants has to be timed so that the energy coupling can be 
effective, and that this timing is not completely pre-programmed because it 
depends on dynamic, on-going changes of state at the cellular, intercellular, and 
global organizational levels. One may presume that at least 1 bit is necessary for 
the proper timing of a chemical reaction. Therefore the flux of biochemical 
reactions would correspond to a rate of information production İ1 = İbiochem > 
2×1021 bits/s. With 6×1013 cells in the body, we obtain a lower limit İlower(cell) > 
4×107 bits/s. When this measure is applied to neurons, we find the dynamic 
chemical complexity of the brain exceeds by 6 orders of magnitude the 
complexity we find at the neural level. With the number of neurons in the human 
brain estimated at N = 1011–1013, the rate of flux of biochemical reactions in the 
human brain would be above 4×1018–4×1020 bits s−1. In a period of 10 years 
(∼3×108 sec), this flux of biochemical reactions can produce an amount of 
information exceeding Ibiochem(brain) ∼ 1027–1029 bits, a much larger quantity 
than the quantity of information represented in the neural network of the human 
brain I1(human brain) ~ 1015–1017 bits obtained above.  
 
In this way, we found a simple solution for resolving the brain–DNA paradox: 
The genetic complexity of DNA and the algorithmic complexity of the brain are 
measures that characterize different levels of complexity altogether. Now let us 
consider the DNA–dynamism paradox.  
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3. The Working Mechanism of the DNA 
 
The question remains: How are we to understand the physical realization of the 
genome’s activity? Actually, how can DNA regulate 4x107 biochemical reactions 
per second in its host cell? The first problem we need to solve to answer this 
question is the fact that DNA contains 109 bits information in the sequence of 
the base pairs, and this is a static form of information. It seems clear that static 
information cannot elicit any processes. Requiring that DNA control all the 
biochemical processes of the organism (Woski and Smith, 2002, 28), the DNA 
must be active, not static. This means that some part of the DNA must change 
relative to the others and it is these changes that instruct the biochemical 
reactions. In order for these internal changes within DNA to elicit biochemical 
processes, they must be related to activating processes. The fastest means of 
such activation are light-induced excitations and electron transfer. 
 
Recently it became clear that long-range single electron transport along the 
DNA as modulated by intervening sequence and sequence-dependent dynamics 
might help to switch genes that are far apart on and off (Nunez, Hall and Barton, 
1999; Coghlan, 1999). Electron transport and proton translocation are intimately 
connected with metabolic activity (Demetrius, 2003), and so with the elementary 
biochemical reactions corresponding to İbiochem. Electronic excited states of 
complex molecular systems represent the main reservoir of free energy in 
biologic processes (Korotkov, 2004). Electronic states of complex molecules 
such as DNA may extend to the whole of the molecule (actually, to the whole of 
the cell and more); and therefore they are suitable tools to transform sequential 
static information into a dynamic form. Certainly, not only the static sequential 
information will play a role, but also the information present in the continuously 
changing excited states and their biological coupling, which is governed not by 
the physical laws per se, but by the biological principle. All biochemical 
reactions can be coupled through electronic states. Our proposal tells that the 
essence of biological organization is that it couples endergonic to exergonic 
processes in a suitable manner, preparing the next timestep’s input boundary 
conditions for action by the physical laws by means of these couplings. In this 
way, DNA becomes able to supply the requirement of timing, determining which 
chemical reactions should occur in the next timestep. Certainly, DNA cannot do 
the regulation alone, since its activity must be coupled to cellular organization 
supplying the necessary chemicals in the necessary places in the right moments, 
utilizing also a significant part of their thermodynamic capacities. Yet in our 
model, the dynamic DNA with its active electrons as modulated by sequential 
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information can still maintain its key role of facilitating genetic control over the 
cellular reactions. 
 
Actually, the timescale for light-induced transfer of electrons (electronic 
transitions) is τ ∼ 10−12 s (Stryer, 1995, 6, Fig. 1–7). The excited electronic  
states of the cell are modulated by the sequential information of DNA within its 
collective electronic cloud. This means that biological organization may couple 
endergonic to exergonic processes that utilize the sequential information of 
DNA in a way that generates light-induced electronic excitations. The 
modulated forms of excited electronic states can decay and emit a photon which 
can activate, e.g., an enzyme, in due time and place. Certainly, the enzymes must 
be able to act in accordance with instantaneous biological needs. Therefore the 
whole cell effectively prepares itself as a receptive state in which the activation 
of a molecule can lead to the realization of the requisite biochemical reaction. 
Most biochemical reactions of cells are related to enzymes and endergonic–
exergonic couplings. This means that the whole cell mobilizes its 
thermodynamic capacities in accordance with the biological principle. 
 
Now let us estimate the thermodynamic potential of a cell. An average human 
organism works with an energy flow of ∼100 W distributed on ∼1014 cells. 
Therefore, an average cell consumes ∼10−12 J s−1. This value at ∼310°K 
corresponds to an energy flow Ė ∼ 3×10−14 J K−1 s−1 in entropic units; converting 
it to units [bits s−1] by the simple formula: Information flow in [bits s−1] can be 
obtained from the energy flow in [J K−1 s−1] when divided by the Boltzmann 
constant k ∼ 1.38×10−23 J K−1 (see e.g., Brillouin, 1956, pp. 1–3), we obtain that 
the dynamic thermodynamic capacity of a cell is İTD (cell) ∼ 2×109 bits s−1. In 
the foregoing we estimated that more than 4×107 reactions occur per cell per 
second. It seems to be plausible to estimate that inducing one reaction involves 
at least one photon and at least one bit of information. Such an estimation yields 
a lower limit for the biologically utilized information flow of a cell İbiol(cell) > 
4×107 bits s−1. This estimation shows that cells may utilize a significant part of 
their thermodynamic potentials for biological aims.  
 
 
4. DNA as the Central Factor of Cells’ Cooperation  
 
Regarding the governing activity of DNA, a second question also arises: How 
does a multicellular organism like a human being coordinate the activities of its 
cells? If the control of the organism is due to DNA, and the individual cell’s 
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biochemical reactions are also controlled by the DNA, then we can conjecture 
that DNA has a twofold function: It has to control local cellular processes as 
well as organizing all these processes into a unique global biological 
organization. This would mean that DNA controls the activity of all the DNA 
molecules that in turn control the activity of the individual cells. All the DNA 
molecules are under the control of all the other DNA molecules such that all 
biochemical reactions serve biological needs useful for the global multicellular 
organism. The question then becomes: How does the DNA molecule sitting in 
one cell know about all the chemical reactions occurring in all the other cells 
governed by the DNA molecules sitting in all the other cells?  
 
It is apparent that multicellular government should be mediated by a 
coordinating activity between the DNA molecules themselves. Therefore, the 
DNA molecule sitting in one molecule should follow all the changes occurring 
in all the other cells. This is a much more demanding task than controlling one 
cell’s activity. This is a task that would require one DNA molecule to act in 
concert with all the other DNA molecules. This means that instead of İ(DNA) ∼ 
İbiol(cell) ∼ 4×107 bits s−1, the changes in the internal states of the DNA 
molecules must be around İ (DNA) ∼ 1021 changes s−1. 
 
Thus the question arises: How is it possible to produce 1021 changes s−1 in a 
DNA molecule if the information content in the sequence of its base pairs is 
only 109 bits? We point out that this requirement can be fulfilled if the timescale 
required to induce a change is 10−12 s. Actually, the DNA molecule is able to 
realize ∼1021 changes per second by the fastest known means of biochemical 
processing — by light-induced electronic excitations (Stryer, 1995, 6, Fig. 1-6). 
This is what one can expect if these changes are generated by biological 
organization that is itself the manifestation of the first principle of biology (e.g., 
the Bauer principle). The action of first principles does not require mechanisms 
in order to be achieved. The first principle of physics, the action principle, does 
not require a computer built into each elementary particle that would compute 
which way the particle ought to go. Instead, particles work with the action 
principle because the action principle is ‘built into’ the elementary particles.  
 
In the hypothetical absence of a first principle of biology, an explanation of the 
governance of electronic excitation states, and the activation of photons, 
enzymes, and proteins that correspond to biologically optimal trajectories, 
would be a computationally unsolvable problem. To govern the states of DNA’s 
109 base pairs in a way that each changes in every time step of ∼10−12 s should 
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occur in the biologically optimal manner requires the presence of a first 
principle of biology in action. There is no way to solve this enormous 
computational problem except by positing a first principle of biology — the 
most economic and (we suspect) the only possible solution. 
 
 
5. On the Activity of the First Principles 
 
The activity of the action principle is best understood by the Feynman path-
integral interpretation. It states that the action principle has a quantum physical 
origin: Each elementary particle emits virtual particles which map all possible 
paths of the whole environment, the collective behavior of which summarizes all 
possible quantum mechanical paths and realizes the extremum of action having 
a dimension [energy][time]. The extremum usually indicates the minimum in 
physical situations (Feynman, Hibbs, 1965, 245). When Feynman introduced the 
path-integral principle, he pointed out that to be able to follow the principle of 
least action, quanta must ‘virtually’ go over all the possible histories, and then 
these add up to the ‘actual’ shortest route. The precondition of such an adding up 
is that in the course of surveying all the possible routes, each quantum virtually 
travels over all the routes — certainly, at a speed much larger than the velocity 
of light. Therefore, it is usually said that the Feynman path integral method 
offers only a model. We note that this model works not only as one of the best of 
physics, the most exact branch of the natural sciences, but it is the core 
technology of modern theoretical physics (Moore, 1996; Taylor, 2003; Moore, 
2004).  
 
The point is that the first principles and the faster-than-light virtual actions 
governing actual interactions are two sides of the same coin.  
 
The integral form of the action principle contains a non-negligible advantage 
over its formulation in differential equations. Differential equations need 
definite initial conditions, while the integral formalism — virtually — includes 
informative interactions with a large set of the environment. Integral principles 
are independent from coordinates, and therefore they can cope with time-
dependent boundary conditions as well. The apparent teleological behavior of 
living organisms may correspond to computational processes determined at the 
organism level, where the organism acts as an agent, following its own interests 
and biological needs, such as survival. Once the biologically favorable endpoint 
of a biological process is prescribed by the organism at the organism level, the 
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problem is simplified; and with the help of the action principle of physics it 
becomes possible to determine the trajectory to be followed, which involves the 
organism’s satisfaction of its biological needs by rearranging its internal 
physical environment.  
 
Let us consider an extended version of the Galilei experiment. In this example, 
not only inanimate things, but also living organisms are dropped from the Pisa 
tower. When a living bird is dropped from a height, it will decide which way to 
go — i.e., to fall to the ground or fly away — and the biological decision will be 
realized directly by the action principle since this is the most economic way to 
organize the physical activities of the bird. Clearly the action principle is 
subservient to biological organization. The decision of the bird about the optimal 
endpoint is obtained through switching out into a new context and wider 
perspectives. If the bird before dropped from a height were in a state of short-
period or quasi-instantaneous perspectives, at the moment when dropped it 
switches into a much wider perspective, the perspective of its life. In this new 
perspective, it decides about the endpoint of its flight. Once the endpoint is 
determined, the physical realization of the trajectory best suited to the selected 
endpoint — survival in this case — can be supplied by the action principle of 
physics as the most economic solution. This economy extends not only to the 
minimization of action, but also to the minimization of biological interventions. 
Absent an integral principle, the bird would need to compute in every time step 
all the necessary boundary conditions for all the physical processes occurring 
within it that may lead to the optimal biological solution regarding the selected 
endpoint of the flight. This task seems to require an overly demanding 
computational faculty, since every elementary process should result from 
previous computations, taking into account all the combinatorial possibilities. 
Without doubt, the action principle is suitable to biological government through 
endpoint determination. It seems that now it is only a step forward to assume 
that the action principle is tailored just for biological purposes. Let us consider 
this hypothesis a bit more closely. 
 
We propose a simple but powerful qualitative idea: that the first principle of 
biology arises at the other extremum of integrated action [energy][time], which 
corresponds to the maximum of integrated action instead of its minimum. 
Biological organization acts to secure the optimal conditions for life. 
Remarkably, it is the maximum of integrated [energy][time] that corresponds to 
the optimal quality of life, as is easily seen with the help of an example.  
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Life’s quality is the better, the more the number of years we live and the more 
free energy we have by which to live our years. Therefore, life’s quality can be 
measured by a quantity: integrated [energy][time]. Now if the first principle of 
biology acts to realize the maximum of vitality (defined as the distance of the 
living organism from the deathly thermodynamic equilibrium) not only in the 
momentary context, but also in the context of our full lifespan, then it appears 
the Bauer principle likewise would require a maximum of a quantity that also 
takes the form of integrated action [energy][time].  
 
We note that vitality — the distance of the living organism from thermodynamic 
equilibrium — is different from Schrödinger’s negative entropy, which measures 
the distance from thermodynamic equilibrium for isolated systems in a static or 
closed environment. By definition, isolated systems cannot exchange matter and 
energy with their environment.  
 
We acknowledge a similar idea of Rashevsky (1973, 177), the founder of 
mathematical biology, who worked out a unified approach to physics, biology, 
and sociology. In this work one of his main achievements is his Postulate 1 
(ibid., 185), which states: “The evolution or time course of change in any 
organismic set is characterized by the requirement that during the total time of 
the existence of an organismic set the total number of different relations 
involved should have a maximum.” In comparison, our formulation tells: 
“Living organisms invest internal work from their free energy resources against 
the equilibrium that should be reached on the basis of the given initial state and 
the physico-chemical laws in order to maximize the total integrated action.”  
 
We saw that the Bauer principle is a variant of the action principle of physics, 
since the Bauer principle maximizes the action, while in physics the action is 
usually minimized. Certainly if DNA works with the Bauer principle, and the 
Bauer principle is a kind of action principle, then the Bauer principle must act in 
the same way as the action principle does: by virtual interactions able to map all 
the universe instantaneously. 
 
The idea that Nature pursues economy in all her workings is one of the oldest 
principles of theoretical science. In a physical problem, the “action” in the action 
principle represents a cost. For example, in Fermat’s principle the cost expended 
by a light ray moving along its path is the transit time. In many engineering 
problems time as well as energy plays the role of a cost, and in such cases the 
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most economic solution is what minimizes the product [energy][time]. This 
recognition triggered suspicions of the presence of economical aspects.  
 
But it seems a bigger problem is involved here: Such economical aspects are 
alien to the physicalist world picture and so usually remain undefined and 
unclear. The action principle has a teleological character that does not fit into the 
present conceptual scheme of physicalism. Instead of predicting the future from 
initial conditions, as for instance when working with differential equations, from 
the more fundamental viewpoint of the action principle, the system starts with a 
combination of initial conditions and final conditions and the task is to find the 
path in between them, as if the system somehow knows where it wants to go. 
Actually, it is generally argued that the system does not need the advantage of 
prior knowledge where it has to go, since the path integral calculates the 
probability amplitude for any given process. But the real problem is that these 
probability amplitudes would need (ostensibly) to be calculated for all the 
possible paths in between.  
 
These problematic and unresolved aspects led to the strange situation in which 
the highest achievement of physics, its first principle, remained largely ignored 
in its real impact, and so left without proper interpretation. Additionally, by our 
proposal action is a basic concept in biology just as it is in physics, since the 
first principle of biology maximizes it. In this way, an elegant situation arises in 
which the two known first principles of Nature both take the same quantity — 
action — to the extreme, each in its own way.  
 
Moreover, since biological organization maximizes action, it is a natural 
requirement of the Bauer principle that once the coupling that can lead to the 
biologically optimal solution is decided and the biological endpoint 
corresponding to optimal life conditions is determined, the physical realization 
of decisions should occur with the minimum of action, since this circumstance is 
the condition of the requirement that life ever navigates towards its maximum by 
means of efficient action within the context of the systemic whole. These 
considerations seem to favor our proposal that the action principle of physics 
arises as a natural consequence of the Bauer principle.  
 
Returning to the working mechanism of DNA, we can illustrate it with the help 
of a parable. DNA acts as a watchtower having 109 lamps. Each lamp is 
switched on or off in every time step, at a frequency interval of roughly 10−12 s. 
Collectively the lamps illuminate an enormous biologically useful information 
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flux. Now switching “on or off” are already decisions that one expects would be 
preceded by information processing. But since the switching on or off occurs at 
the speed of light, and no physical event can occur at a speed faster than the 
speed of light, there is no physical possibility for information processing to 
precede the event characterized by the condition “on or off.” 
 
Therefore we realize that DNA works with the help of a factor that is utterly 
beyond DNA’s or any other material system’s physical capabilities. On our view, 
this something is immaterial yet effective and belongs to science — this 
something we have denoted as a first principle. The first principle of biology 
acts as a deeper intelligence of the “vacuum,” in the sense that it virtually maps 
all the possible histories; summarizes the results of this mapping on its own 
basis; then decides about the biological endpoint; and from there, “chooses” the 
optimum physically realizable path.  
 
Let us keep in mind that the action principle also acts as a mediated, faster-than-
light virtual process that maps the entire universe before the quantum makes its 
“decision” as to which way to go. Therefore, the strange ability of DNA 
processing information faster than the speed of light is in good company; 
namely, in the company of the action principle, the formulation of which by the 
path-integral formalism has led to some of the greatest achievements of physics. 
Just as physics resonates to its first principle, the action principle, so DNA acts 
by the first principle of biology, the life principle (about the life principle see the 
theoretical biology of Bauer, 1935/1967).  
 
Now if virtual particles correspond to the vacuum, and virtual particles 
correspond not only to the physical but also to the biological first principle, than 
the vacuum must have not only a physical but also a biological nature. We 
revealed the existence of the biological vacuum. 
 
Perhaps we are now aware that we have penetrated the realm of ultimate reality. 
Nevertheless, we feel safe because we find ourselves in the best company, 
together with the first principles of modern science, which are the safest ground 
yet achieved by science. Now it is clear that if DNA is governed by the life 
principle, then the theory of evolution and theoretical physics work with toolkits 
from partially different conceptual storehouses. We do not require the 
introduction of new elements into scientific research; we just take into account 
the most effective tools of science, the first principles, at their real face value. 
Our solution is the most economic possible: It extends the action principle just 
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by one step so to include the selection of biological endpoints. This solution 
offers the most effective way to integrate the action principle and Ervin Bauer’s 
life principle. 
 
 
6. Evolution or Divine Action? Complexity Jumps in the  
History of Life 
 
As Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmáry show in their Table 1.1 (1995, 5), the 
coding part of the bacterial genome has Nbp (bacterial) ∼ 4×106 base pairs and 
the human genome has Nbp (human) ∼ 6×108 base pairs. We find it remarkable 
that the size of the coding DNA shows a mere hundredfold increase from 
bacteria to humans, from 4×106 base pairs to 6×108 base pairs. It is widely 
thought that terrestrial life was already present within 100 million years after the 
solidification of the Earth’s crust. Now we only point out the obvious, below we 
will argue for it quantitatively: Evolution is possible only in the presence of life. 
Chemical abiogenesis cannot produce algorithmic and genetic complexity from 
morphological complexity, just as emergent phenomena cannot produce the laws 
of nature. 
 
In this context, it is important to take into account the fundamental fact that the 
laws of physics have a very low information content, since their algorithmic 
complexity can be characterized by a computer program less than a thousand 
characters (Chaitin, 1985). In a personal communication, Chaitin wrote (2004): 
“My paper on physics was never published, only as an IBM report. In it I took: 
Newton’s laws, Maxwell’s laws, the Schrödinger equation, and Einstein’s field 
equations for curved spacetime near a black hole, and solved them numerically, 
giving ‘motion-picture’ solutions. The programs, which were written in an 
obsolete computer programming language APL2 at roughly the level of 
Mathematica, were all about half a page long, which is amazingly simple.”  
 
Now one may estimate the complexity of a page as approximately 2×103 bits, 
since the average rate of information processing in reading is about 50 bits s−1 
(Breuer, 1995, 13); and so at a reading rate of 1.5 pages per minute, the 
information content of a page is about 103 bits. Taking a page from Chaitin, we 
thus surmise that the algorithmic complexity of physical equations is 
surprisingly low, Ialgorithmic(physical equations) ∼ 103 bits. We think that the low 
algorithmic complexity of the physical laws is shown also by the fact that 
present-day physical cosmological models fail to account for such basic 
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phenomena as stellar activity, not to mention protein-based life, with its 
extremely rich variability.  
 
In contrast to the basic claim of physicalism, the failure of cosmological models 
with respect to biology is not a practical, but a principal one. Physical models 
are not only unable to predict biological phenomena, but there is no physical 
model that can calculate from the positions of particles whether an animal will 
go left or right from its initial state, nor account for any characteristics of the 
trajectory of the animal. Moreover, seemingly there are no scientific works in 
progress in this particular field. No physical models are under construction that 
could predict such simple phenomena. In contrast, our biological approach is 
able to work out such a model. Once the main range of the biological endpoint is 
determined by biological needs and aims, the arising physical trajectory of a bird 
dropped from a height can be derived (Grandpierre, manuscript). 
 
This suggests that information-producing complexity jumps simply are not 
possible in the case of physical systems, for such jumps are novel increases of 
complexity: They are ever jumps “up”.  
 
Certainly, the observed flow of environmental information is enormous, but it  
is morphological information. Now since we cannot expect that Big Bang  
(or recycling) cosmological models obtained initial conditions corresponding to 
an algorithmic complexity higher than the algorithmic complexity of the 
physical laws themselves, we can estimate that the complexity measure of 
physics — initial and boundary conditions and physical equations included — is 
also about I(physics) ∼ 103 bits.  
 
The central thesis of physicalism proclaims the causal closure of the physical. 
Ashby’s Law (Ashby, 1962) and Kahre’s Law of Diminishing Information 
(Kahre, 2002) stated that physical systems cannot produce more information at 
their output than was present at their input. This means that for physical 
systems, complexity jumps are simply not possible. Therefore the fact that we 
observe complexity up-jumps here on Earth strongly indicates the presence of 
life. 
 
The comparison of machines and living organisms can shed light on the nature 
of biological organization. Once the machine is constructed, its algorithmic 
complexity is fixed. Even in machines programmed with “learning abilities,” 
only phenomenal data can be involved, and such data cannot increase 
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algorithmic complexity. In contrast, biological organization is able to increase 
not only algorithmic, but also genetic complexity, as shown by the blossoming 
of complexity in plants, animals, and in evolution generally.  
 
We point out that there was a much greater complexity up-jump between the 
early Earth without life and the first bacteria (from 103 bits to 4×106 bits, a jump 
of J1(108 years) ∼ 4×103, within about t1 ~ 108 years) than between the first 
bacteria and humans (from 4x106 bits to 6×108 bits, a jump of J2(4×109 years) ∼ 
150, during t2 ∼ 4×109 years). It means that abiogenetic evolution should be 
more than thousand-fold faster (J1/J2*t2/t1 ∼ 1067) than biological evolution. 
This fact seems strange, since we recognize that chemical abiogenesis appears 
(in principle) unable to accelerate the evolution of complexity faster than the 
evolution of life itself. The question inevitably arises: How can we expect 
chemical evolution to reach a twenty-seven times higher increase in complexity 
within a forty times shorter time period than life itself managed to do?  
 
In this context, an example may be enlightening. Hoyle (1983, 243) pointed out 
that to solve the Rubik cube by one random step in every second, it would take 
1.35×1012 years. The chance against each move producing perfect color 
matching for all the cube’s faces is about 5×1019 to 1. Now if an intelligence is 
present, reporting after each move whether it was successful or not, reckoning 1 
minute for each successful move and, say, 120 moves to reach the solution, the 
solution of the same Rubik cube may be reached within 2 hours. This fact 
indicates that the presence of life or intelligence can accelerate evolution in a 
rate higher than ∼6v1015 (1.35×1012 years/2 hours ∼ 5.9*1015). Certainly, the 
abiotic processes are not completely random — modifying the success ratio with 
and without intelligence from about 1016 to somewhat lower. 
 
There exists a popular example of monkeys that can type Shakespeare’s 
complete oeuvre on a typewriter. Actually, to type only one sentence from 
Hamlet, consisting of 40 letters, each selected from 30 possibilities, it would be 
necessary to realize 3040 ∼ 1059 trials. Let us assume that we have ten billion 
monkeys — that is, rather more monkeys than there are currently people in the 
world. And let us imagine each monkey hits one key per second. Let us further 
assume that they never stop to sleep or eat or anything else. It will still take 
more than 1049 seconds before one of the monkeys has the luck to hit on the 
right sequence. Now one year is about 32 million seconds, so it will take our 
world population of monkeys about 3×1041 years to get there.  
 
Attila Grandpierre 
 
586 
Now how would it be possible that the absence of monkeys and typewriters — 
corresponding to the case of chemical abiogenesis — could accelerate the 
process to write an amount of information corresponding to Shakespeare’s 
whole Hamlet? Certainly, one cannot expect that chemical evolution would be 
able to produce useful amounts of genetic complexity in the absence of agents. 
Even in the presence of “inanimate agents,” it seems highly implausible to 
expect that the accumulation rate of genetic information by chemical 
abiogenesis in an assumedly physical environment (information accumulation in 
physical systems is excluded by Ashby’s Law, Kahre’s Law, and causal closure) 
could produce a meaningfully higher jump in genetic information than the jump 
produced by life during its 4×109 years of evolution. Why should “inanimate 
agents,” if they exist at all, be more efficient than living agents possessing much 
higher genetic complexity?  
 
The complexity measures and their analysis presented here argue that the birth 
of life here on the Earth is counterindicated by two strong constraints. The first 
constraint arises from Ashby’s Law, Kahre’s Law, and the hypothesis of the 
causal closure of the physical. This constraint tells that there is no free lunch  
of algorithmic and deeper complexities. Algorithmic and deeper (genetic, 
principal) complexities can be generated only in the presence of life. The second 
constraint arises from the comparison of the complexity jumps J1 and J2 
estimated above. It remains the task of the believers of abiogenesis theory to 
show how abiogenetic evolution can be more than 103 faster than biological 
evolution, even if biological evolution is indicated to be faster by a factor 
∼6×1015 or higher (see the example of writing Shakespeare’s Hamlet by 
abiogenetic ways, without monkeys and typewriters). 
 
Our results quantitatively argue that life at its fundaments acts by almost fully 
informed light, filled with information produced in the virtual reality of the 
quantum vacuum fields, governed by the first principle of biology: the Bauer 
principle. This aspect lends an intelligent character to the dynamic form of 
genetic complexity. On the other hand, we also acknowledge the role of natural 
selection in the evolution of genetic complexity. The arguments presented here 
together seem to point towards the hypothesis that evolution understood as the 
increase of complexity is possible only in the presence of life. 
 
We found strong quantitative indications showing that life in the virtual quantum 
vacuum belongs to the utmost foundation of the Universe, and it is this cosmic 
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life that is responsible for the evolution of genetic complexity from bacteria to 
humans here on Earth.  
 
In the picture outlined above, the natural sciences do not exhaust their 
possibilities in physics and applied physics, but involve biology (and arguably 
psychology or the science of self-consciousness) as well. The integral and 
natural approach presented here differs from the intelligent design theories in 
that it does not refer to an intelligent factor beyond Nature, but involves a deeper 
intelligence represented within Nature in the form of first principles from which 
all the fundamental laws of physics and biology can be deduced and tested by 
empirical experience.  
 
The integral approach opens new perspectives before modeling biological 
behavior, collecting, grouping and explaining yet unexplained phenomena. 
Moreover, it is able to offer predictions on the basis of these first principles, 
which can then be tested by empirical measurements. For example, the Bauer-
principle predicts that in living organisms all the processes governed by physical 
laws (decay of proteins, heat radiated away, entropy increase, etc.) will be 
accompanied by processes that will practically compensate the decrease of 
distance from thermodynamic equilibrium. In living organisms, the fundamental 
coupling is not between spatiotemporal coordinates, but between global 
thermodynamic variables of the organisms. 
 
More concretely, the integral approach offers an explanatory model for 
biological phenomena such as a bird dropped from a height (a prototype of all 
physical processes). All physical phenomena proceed towards equilibrium: a 
stone dropped from a height, a warm pond cooling at the onset of evening cold, 
or a sugar cube dissolving in a cup of tea. All these processes have their 
characteristic timescales. In living organisms, many similar processes occur, but 
most of them are compensated for by thermodynamically uphill processes. 
Therefore, the physical approach cannot model biological behavior at the level 
of global organization, such as the trajectory of a thirsty animal towards a river. 
In contrast, the integral model allows the existence of biological aspects such as 
the determination of biological endpoints by the organism itself. Once the 
existence of biologically determined endpoints is acknowledged, the integral 
approach facilitates the determination of the physical trajectory corresponding to 
the given biological end. The integral model offers the simplest and most 
effective approach; it is able to predict and it can be tested, therefore fulfilling 
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the sharpest criteria of methodological science. The utmost simplicity at the 
level of seeming utmost complexity is also explained by the biological principle.  
 
 
7. Summary 
 
We derived quantitative measures of algorithmic complexity of the human brain 
and of genetic complexity of the human organism. Already these simple 
complexity measures indicate a paradox of how the brain’s complexity can be 
larger than the complexity of the whole organism. The resolution of this paradox 
leads us to recognize that genetic information corresponds to a deeper than 
algorithmic level of complexity. In our consideration of how DNA can regulate 
the biochemical activities of the organism, we point out that “static” DNA must 
be complemented by a dynamic complexity that corresponds to its static 
sequential information content. Numerical estimations show that DNA’s changes 
are regulated by light that is almost fully informed by biologically useful 
information. Qualitative arguments based on Ashby’s Law, Kahre’s Law and the 
hypothesis of causal closure as well as quantitative arguments based on 
complexity measures of life show strong indications against abiogenesis. We 
point out that complexity measures show that genetic complexity cannot be 
produced from environmental effects alone but are governed by the already 
known, quantitatively formulated first principle of theoretical biology (Bauer, 
1935/1967, 51) that is on a similarly firm footing as modern theoretical physics. 
This means that biological evolution is governed fundamentally by the Bauer 
principle, and natural selection represents an important, but secondary factor.  
 
Key words: algorithmic complexity, dynamic complexity measures, genetic 
complexity, working mechanism of DNA. 
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Dialogue 
Philip Ball 
Understanding life processes in terms of flows of information seems like a 
fruitful way to proceed in attempting to answer Erwin Schrödinger’s question 
‘what is life?’ But it seems to me that this issue is a subtle one that can be 
obscured as much as it is elucidated by the contemporary emphasis on DNA as a 
depository of digital information. The relationship between the genetic 
sequences in DNA and the molecular processes of life is by no means obvious. 
Take, for example, the way in which cell behaviour is regulated by the operation 
of protein ion channels. There is certainly a form of logic to this function: the 
output, transmembrane potential say, can be regulated by a variety of input 
signals, such as mechanical forces, temperature, the presence of other ions or 
ligands. The way this transduction occurs is mediated by physical laws of an 
analog nature, for example Fickian diffusion, thermal fluctuations, electrical 
gradients. One might argue that, in defining the shape and structure of the ion 
channel, genetic information in DNA ‘governs’ the process — but what does 
that really mean? Does the static information in the gene encoding the protein 
somehow dictate the temporal switching behaviour of the gated channel over 
time? No, surely here DNA is more like the medieval God who lays down the 
initial laws of the universe before sitting back and simply letting them unfold, 
without constant intervention. The process unfolds because of the nature of the 
changing environment, acting on a set of preconditions, and not because of 
tampering by the agency of those preconditions. 
 
This is why I am somewhat puzzled by Grandpierre’s conception of DNA 
‘controlling’ cellular biochemical reactions. It rather sounds as though he 
requires this control to be constantly ‘active’: a reaction cannot proceed as it 
should unless DNA is doing something to ensure that, which then seems to 
demand ultrafast processes involving, say, electron transport. This, perhaps, is 
where we are led by modern biology’s insistence on the primacy of DNA as the 
‘author’ of life, so that things cannot be trusted to unfold of their own accord 
(which is to say, on the basis of simple physicochemical processes). The 
problem seems to become even more profound once we consider how individual 
cells coordinate their activity: as Grandpierre asks, “How does the DNA 
molecule sitting in one cell know about all the chemical reactions occurring in  
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all the other cells?” It seems to me that the answer is that the DNA does not have 
to ‘know’ anything; there are mechanisms for cell-cell communication (some of 
which, in higher organisms, use the very fast transmission of electrochemical 
potentials to connect remote regions) which have become adapted in such a way 
as to permit spontaneous, functionally directed self-organization of the 
multicellular body. One can see primitive self-organized behaviours of this sort 
in single-celled organisms that can display some collective behaviour when the 
conditions dictate, such as the slime mold Dictyostelium discoideum. The DNA 
does not have to act as some kind of godlike molecular overseer in these 
situations. 
 
With this in mind, it seems no longer obvious why one need invoke the kind of 
biological first principle that Grandpierre discusses towards the end of his article 
— one that acts as a kind of faster-than-light ‘deeper intelligence of the 
vacuum’, deciding about biological endpoints and then mapping the pathway 
there. (Incidentally, where does the teleological ‘biological endpoint’ come 
from? Since when did we need to invoke any prescience to biology in order that 
it ‘works’? Biology is, from moment to moment, surely quite blind, and it is 
only evolution that has installed an apparent ‘purpose’ to it all.) 
 
This insistence on absolute and rigid genetic control of biological processes 
seems to be what motivates the notion of DNA as a ‘watchtower’ switching on 
each of its lamps every 10−12 s. To me, this conjures up the image of an over-
zealous lighthouse keeper convinced that no sailor can by themselves work out 
how to navigate the rocks, whatever the weather or the time of day. At any 
event, why does this switching have to happen ‘at the speed of light’, demanding 
some kind of mysterious superluminal agency that dictates the pattern of 
switching? I don’t understand that. Yet it leads to the even stranger notion of a 
‘biological vacuum’, which seems to me to be some agency that gives organisms 
biological foresight of the kind that evolution ensures they don’t actually need. 
 
Another claim for which I can’t find sufficient motivation is the idea that 
biological systems maximize action. This seems to depend on an assumption 
that organisms ‘try’ to live for as long as possible. But that isn’t so. They live for 
as long as is evolutionarily convenient. In conventional Neodarwinian terms, the 
sole imperative is to maximize the prospects of propagating one’s genes: 
survival is generally a concomitant of this, but not survival at any cost — for 
example, an organism might stand to benefit more from devoting its limited 
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resources to reproduction than to cell repair. In any event, the hypothesis of 
maximal action seems to be one that is asserted but never proved. 
 
At root, I am perhaps most perplexed by the notion that algorithmic complexity 
has to be high to account for biological phenomena. Has it not been one of the 
underpinnings of complexity science that complex behaviours can arise from 
simple rules? Grandpierre asserts that no physical models can account for the 
trajectories of biological organisms. But they can! Models of ant motion, driven 
by simple ideas such as chemotaxis and random searching, can reproduce the 
behaviour of ant colonies rather well. For simple organisms such as bacteria, it 
seems even possible in principle that one might measure from moment to 
moment all the environmental influences acting on a single cell, and thereby 
predict its motion with great precision. Certainly, it is not clear why there need 
be anything mysterious or aphysical about this behaviour. 
 
Grandpierre argues that abiogenesis cannot seem to create, in a sufficiently short 
time, the complexity we see in life: if I understand correctly, he implies that only 
life (or ‘intelligence’) can beget life. To my mind, there are two shortcomings 
with this. First, it assumes that accumulation of complexity is linear, whereas it 
now seems that many complex systems possess thresholds above which entirely 
new modes of behaviour — new capabilities — appear. Secondly, I see no 
explicit role here for evolution: for the quite remarkable efficiency of searching 
in the landscape of possibilities for effective ‘answers’ that is permitted by the 
rather simple algorithm of random mutation and replication in the face of limited 
resources. Diversification and complexification are, in this respect, boosted by 
the fact that every evolutionary step broadens and modifies the landscape in 
which subsequent steps are taken: evolution does not simply have to respond to 
a preordained landscape, but to itself. To my mind, “intelligence in Nature” here 
becomes another God of the gaps, an expression for what we do not yet 
understand (and what therefore astounds us) about the capacity of the physical 
world to generate richness and complexity. 
 
Attila Grandpierre 
I agree with Ball’s note that the recent emphasis on DNA as a depository of 
digital information might be an overstatement. Indeed, as I tried to indicate it in 
my chapter, perhaps not consequently enough, it is the cell as a whole, with all 
its constituents and biological couplings, which governs the cell’s behavior, and 
not the DNA alone. For example, I argued that the cell utilizes a significant part 
of its thermodynamic potential for biological organization. Regarding the 
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problem I raised in my chapter, namely, that the static information of the DNA 
in itself is not suitable to govern (or participate in) the time sequence of 
biochemical reactions. In my point of view, this is a fundamental unsolved 
problem of modern biology. It seems that Ball approaches only the physical 
aspect of the cell’s behavior. Indeed, enlisting the physically influential 
parameters of the input and the output of the process regulating the behavior of 
the cell, he implicitly ignores the biological aspects of the problem. The 
biological aspects of the cell’s behavior are related to thermodynamically uphill 
reactions made possible by biological couplings between endergonic and 
exergonic reactions. My point is that the DNA also contributes to the biological 
coupling processes through spontaneous photon emissions and absorptions, 
electron transfer and many other ways, in coherence with all the biochemical 
processes, all of which are governed ultimately by an autonomous biological 
principle. (continued below). 
 
Philip Ball  
This seems possible, but is there any evidence for it? I’m aware 
only of, e.g. electron transfer in DNA perhaps playing a role in 
DNA damage.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
It has been pointed out that the genetic code is useless without the 
supporting cellular machinery — first of all, without properly 
functioning proteins, required for DNA/RNA functioning (Ben 
Jacob, Shapira, Tauber, 2006, Seeking the foundations of 
cognition in bacteria: from Schrödinger's negative entropy to latent 
information. Physica A 359, pp. 495-524; p. 515). It is clear that 
static, sequential information is useless in generating the dynamic 
biological organization (Grandpierre, 2007, NeuroQuantology 5, 
pp. 346-362). As I wrote in my chapter: “Recently it became clear 
that long-range single electron transport along the DNA as 
modulated by intervening sequence and sequence-dependent 
dynamics might help to switch genes that are far apart on and off 
(Nunez, Hall, and Barton, 1999; Coghlan, 1999). Electron 
transport and proton translocation are intimately connected with 
metabolic activity (Demetrius, 2003), and so with the elementary 
biochemical reaction flux”.  
 
Attila Grandpierre (continued) 
This means that, in contrast of Ball’s opinion, DNA does not act like the 
medieval (deistic) God who lays down only the initial laws of the universe 
before sitting back and simply letting them unfold. Instead, DNA, together with 
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all the subsystems of the cell, continuously changes and these changes add up to 
the changes of the cell’s behavior (continued below).  
 
Philip Ball  
I still don’t see why this is necessary. Isn’t it one of the basic 
principles of self-organized systems that they do not need a 
constant ‘hand on the tiller’?  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
The difference between physical self-organization and biological 
organization is that physical self-organization does not need a 
continuous control. In contrast to physical self-organization, in 
biological organization a continuous flux of information is 
required to govern biochemical reactions.  
 
Philip Ball  
To take a simple example, where is the ‘information’ that promotes 
lipid assembly?  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
Lipid assembly corresponds to a concrete, fix form of information. 
In contrast, another type corresponding of biochemical reactions 
also exists representing continuously changing information 
corresponding to continuously changing external and internal 
conditions. Biological organization governs the relation between 
such prefixed cycles.  
 
Philip Ball  
It is not obviously ‘in’ the genes that encode lipid-synthesis 
enzymes, but follows from physicochemical principles.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
It seems that the example of lipid assembly within given physical 
conditions simplifies biology to physics by throwing out the baby 
with the bath water. Biology is present not within the framework 
of an already definite physical problem, but, on the contrary, 
biology prepares the conditions for the physical laws to act. 
Biology is the control science of physics. The point is that biology 
starts ‘before’ physics, preparing the input conditions for the 
physical laws. Once the physical conditions are suitably prepared 
by biological organization, the rest is physics, I agree. I am 
speaking about the biological aspect, while you seem to be 
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concerned with the physical aspect of the problem. It seems we are 
speaking about different aspects of the same subject.  
 
  
Attila Grandpierre (continued)  
I emphasize that not only the outer environment is influential in determining the 
behavior of the cell, but the internal environment, too, the determination is not 
absolute, and it does not occur only on the basis of physical laws. Physical laws 
are the ultimate, instantaneous tools of biological reactions, but the conditions 
within which the physical laws act are governed by biological couplings in a 
way that within the continuously changing biological conditions the physical 
laws result a biological behavior which is at variance with the physical behavior 
which would arise in the absence of biological couplings. Cells can utilize the 
significant part of their thermodynamic potential only through couplings of 
endergonic and exergonic reactions making it possible to compensate the 
otherwise inevitable approach towards thermodynamic equilibrium due to 
entropy increasing physical processes by thermodynamically uphill processes 
like active transport, regeneration of gradients etc. 
 
Attila Grandpierre  
In the second paragraph, Ball seems to ignore my point that the whole cell is 
involved in biological organization when speaking about “Grandpierre’s 
conception of DNA ‘controlling’ cellular biochemical reactions”. My 
conception is much more modest. I argue only that the DNA must contribute to 
the government of biological processes.  
 
Philip Ball  
It rather sounds as though he requires this control to be constantly ‘active’: a 
reaction cannot proceed as it should unless DNA is doing something to ensure 
that, which then seems to demand ultrafast processes involving, say, electron 
transport.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
Again, the root of the misunderstanding lies in the different approaches. Ball 
seems to be involved in the physical approach, considering the moment to 
moment changes of a certain reaction, with all its physical input conditions 
already prepared. In contrast, I consider biological behavior in a longer 
timescale, in the biological context, in which these input conditions are 
influenced by biological couplings related not only to physical laws and physical 
conditions but to biological needs and ends as well. (continued below) 
 
Philip Ball  
But is this ‘broader picture’ not an emergent property?  
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Attila Grandpierre  
A property can emerge, but a law cannot. Phenomenal complexity 
can emerge in a physical process, but algorithmic complexity 
cannot. Emergence is a process at the morphological/phenomenal 
level, while laws exist at the level of algorithmic complexity. 
Physical laws cannot emerge from material properties (like mass, 
charge, or size). If biological behavior is governed by the Bauer 
principle, which cannot be derived from the physical principle of 
the least action, it cannot emerge from physics.  
 
Philip Ball  
Shaped by intermolecular interactions but not obviously derivable 
from them?  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
Recently, it has become clear that simple bacteria can exhibit rich 
behavior, have internal degrees of freedom, informational 
capabilities, and freedom to respond by altering itself and others 
via emission of signals in a self-regulated manner (Ben-Jacob, E. 
2003, Bacterial self-organization: co-enhancement of 
complexification and adaptability in a dynamic environment. Phil. 
Trans. R. Soc. Lond. A, 361:1283-1312). Each bacterium is, by 
itself, a biotic autonomous system, having a certain freedom to 
select its response to the biochemical messages it receives, 
including self-alteration, self-plasticity, and decision making, 
permitting purposeful alteration of its behavior (Ben Jacob, 
Aharonov and Shapira, 2005, Bacteria harnessing complexity. 
Biofilms, 1, 239-263; 
http://star.tau.ac.il/~eshel/papers/11.11.04.pdf). Bacteria are able to 
reverse the spontaneous course of entropy increase and convert 
high-entropy inorganic substances into low-entropy life-sustaining 
molecules (ibid.). Similarly, di Primio, Müller, and Lengeler (2000, 
SAB2000 Proceedings Supplement, International Society for 
Adaptive Behavior, 3-12,  
http://www.ais.fraunhofer.de/~diprimio/publications/diprimio_Min
Cog.pdf) have demonstrated that bacteria and other unicellular 
organisms are autonomous and social beings showing cognition in 
the forms of association, remembering, forgetting, learning, etc., 
activities that are found in all living organisms. It is widely 
recognized recently that biochemical reactions are regulated by 
complex conditions involving practically the whole cell, governed 
possibly by a yet unknown principle (see Ben Jacob, Shapira and 
Tauber, 2006, Seeking the foundations of cognition in bacteria: 
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from Schrödinger's negative entropy to latent information. Physica 
A 359,  495–524.).  
 
Philip Ball  
To my mind, DNA simply encodes the local rules that enable such 
large-scale properties to emerge from the biochemical network. In 
this sense, DNA does not really contain a ‘blueprint’ of the 
organism.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
One of the main points in my chapter is that the changes of the 
DNA that contribute to selecting, timing and localizing 
biochemical reactions are regulated by the Bauer principle. I agree 
with Ball’s claim that that DNA’s instructions are the result of the 
biochemical network, but only with the reservation that the 
biological ‘network’ is in the actual cell an astronomically 
enormous dynamic flux of biochemical reactions, estimated in my 
chapter to represent an information flux around 107 bits s-1 cell-1, 
which is governed by the Bauer principle. In this respect, the term 
‘blueprint of the organism’ is misleading since suggesting that the 
biochemical processes are determined by a static material structure 
similar to a ‘blueprint’. Instead, my argument tells that the 
dynamic flux of biochemical reactions is ultimately governed by 
the Bauer principle; similarly to physics, since physical behavior is 
governed by the least action principle. Actually, the ‘local rules of 
the DNA’ can be at work only when relying on the universal 
biological principle; therefore, they are based on the Bauer 
principle. 
 
(continued)  
Philip Ball  
It seems to me that the answer is that the DNA does not have to ‘know’ 
anything; there are mechanisms for cell-cell communication (some of which, in 
higher organisms, use the very fast transmission of electrochemical potentials to 
connect remote regions) which have become adapted in such a way as to permit 
spontaneous, functionally directed self-organization of the multicellular body.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
In contrast, I emphasize that DNA has to be informed about the cellular 
processes, otherwise it cannot contribute to the biological organization in a 
biologically useful manner. I suggest that ultimately, the DNA is informed by 
virtual interactions (continued below). 
 
Chapter 28: Fundamental Complexity Measures of Life 
 
599 
Philip Ball  
What are ‘virtual interactions’?  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
Virtual interactions are interactions mediated by virtual particles. 
In the double slit experiment of quantum physics, the action 
principle is realized by virtual interactions mapping the whole 
situation and integrating the quantum amplitudes corresponding to 
all possible trajectories of the quanta. Feynman’s path integral 
approach indicates that quanta explore all possible paths between 
the initial and end states (Taylor, 2003, Amer. J. Phys. 2003; 71: 
423–425.; Moore, 2004, Amer. J. Phys. 2004, 72 : 522–527.), and 
the resulting path is the integrated sum of all these paths. Virtual 
interactions are governed in physics by the action principle 
(Feynman and Hibbs, 1965, Quantum Mechanics and Path 
Integrals, McGraw-Hill.  
 
(continued) that determine the biological couplings, which govern biological 
processes like cell-to-cell communication etc. It seems that the conflict between 
the physical and the biological approach is manifest when Ball speaks about 
permitting “spontaneous, functionally directed self-organization of the 
multicellular body”. The point is that physical self-organization is a process 
which is governed by physical laws. In contrast, biological or functional 
organization serves a biological need or end, like a biological function, a 
concept alien to physics. Therefore functionally directed self-organization is not 
a physical process. It is possible only with the assistance of biological couplings 
which most fundamentally determine the input conditions for the physical laws 
(continued below). 
 
Philip Ball  
Aha! Maybe this is really where our views diverge. It seems to me 
that all one needs to obtain function is physical self-organization 
coupled to selective pressure.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
As I pointed out above, physical self-organization occurs only 
occasionally, while life requires continuous modifications of the 
input conditions of physical laws. Function is clearly a biological 
concept. In general, I define biological function as consisting from 
processes solving a biologically useful task. In cases of physical 
self-organization like formation of snowflake patterns, or Benard 
convection cells, we cannot speak about biological functions. 
Certainly, we cannot speak about ‘selection pressure’ in case of 
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physical self-organization processes. Therefore, it is possible to 
couple physical self-organization to selective pressure only in case 
of living organisms. Now living organisms are governed by the 
Bauer principle, and so it is not allowed to exclude the biological 
principle from the picture by substituting it with physical self-
organization plus selective processes.  
 
Philip Ball  
Certainly, that seems to work in in vitro chemical evolution.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
Certainly, one cannot speak about biological functions in case of 
chemical evolution. I note that this point requires ramifications in 
the context of the problem of continuity of life with the apparently 
inanimate world, as many scientists suggested; e.g. Editorial, 2007, 
The meaning of ’life’, Nature 447, pp. 1031-1032.  
 
(continued) 
Philip Ball  
“With this in mind, it seems no longer obvious why one need invoke the kind of 
biological first principle that Grandpierre discusses towards the end of his 
article,…deciding about biological endpoints and then mapping the pathway 
there”.   
 
Attila Grandpierre  
Certainly, with this in mind, i.e. with the physical approach in mind and 
overlooking the fundamental difference between the physical and biological 
self-organization, it seems no longer obvious the need for an autonomous 
biological organization.   
 
Philip Ball  
Incidentally, where does the teleological ‘biological endpoint’ come from? Since 
when did we need to invoke any prescience to biology in order that it ‘works’?  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
Yes, the teleological biological endpoint comes from the biological principle, 
the most action principle, as well as from the autonomous selection from the 
range of all possible biologically prescribed biological endpoints by the 
organism. For example, when a bird is dropped from a height from the Pisa 
tower, in the first moment it moves exactly like a dead bird or a stone, i.e. 
following the law of free fall. But as moment comes after moment, slowly the 
bird starts to modify its internal structure with the help of biological couplings, 
and with the help of the energy resources arising from the exergonic reactions 
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make it possible to initiate biologically useful endergonic reactions. With the 
help of self-initiated internal changes, modifying its external shape, the bird 
extends its wings and modifies its trajectory. In contrast to widespread opinions, 
teleology is not alien in science, see e.g. Thomas Nagel (1979, Teleology 
Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science. New York, 
Columbia University Press, p. 278.). Teleology is directly related to functions 
(continued below). 
 
Philip Ball  
But evolutionary theory surely shows that function does not imply 
teleology?  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
Evolutionary theory does not explain the origin and nature of 
biological functions. It only indicates that systems of biological 
functions, once they exist, can evolve. Machines receive functions 
only by human activity. Machine’s functions represent human 
teleology, or purpose. Biological functions serve biological 
purposes (see also Buller, D. J. 2002, Function and Teleology, in: 
Encyclopedia of Life Sciences, p. 393), since ultimately they 
represent biological endpoint selection as input for the action 
principle. Without biological endpoint selection serving the most 
action principle, only the least action principle would be at work, 
and so only physical processes could occur, driving the organism 
towards thermodynamic equilibrium and death. Therefore, 
biological functions inevitably represent biological teleology. 
 
(continued) 
Attila Grandpierre  
…and biology is the science of mechanisms and functions. “Biology, the 
scientific study of living organisms, is concerned with both mechanistic 
explanations and with the study of function.” (Purves, Orians and Heller, 1992, 
Life. The Science of Biology, 1) Therefore, it would be unscientific to ignore the 
directly teleological aspects of living organisms. The characteristic difference 
between the physical approach and the biological one is present again in the 
sentence of Ball: 
 
Philip Ball  
“Biology is, from moment to moment, surely quite blind”.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
In physics, the differential equations plus completely blind random fluctuations 
govern the behavior from moment to moment. In biology, the case is very 
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similar for changes occurring from moment to moment, but very different for 
changes occurring from the initial state to the final state. Living organisms are 
able to mobilize their internal energy resources, and, through biological 
couplings, they can initiate investment of biologically useful work (to recharge 
their potentials, or to fly away from the free fall trajectory). While the flight of 
the fallen bird can be regarded from moment to moment as determined by 
physical conditions, biological couplings act in order to modify the input 
conditions of the physical equations continuously and systematically, 
deteriorating the bird from the physical trajectory and making it able to follow 
any trajectory consistent with the biological principle. (continued below). 
 
Philip Ball  
To my mind, the bird has been given a ‘flying instinct’ by 
evolution, which it exercises. This ‘flying instinct’ is a 
consequence of blind exploration of evolutionary space, coupled to 
selection.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
In the first chapter “Gaps and Inconsistencies in Modern 
Evolutionary Thought” of the 728 pages book of West-Eberhard 
(2003, Developmental Plasticity and Evolution, Oxford University 
Press) a whole list of basic problems of evolutionary theory are 
presented. It becomes more and more clear that Darwinian theory 
is so logically flabby it can “explain” anything by subtly changing 
the terms of the debate.  Evolutionary theory can show only that 
systems of functions may evolve in a changing environment, but 
does not explain how an individual cell selects from the 
astronomically large domain of biological possibilities. 
Evolutionary theory concerns only the historical life forms 
appearing on the earth. It considers only a part of biological 
phenomena, instead of working out the general theory of biological 
processes and deriving the more special phenomena from the more 
general laws as it is possible in physics. In contrast, the theoretical 
biology of Ervin Bauer established the most universal law of 
biology in an exact manner which is quite compatible with the 
exactness of physics. These arguments indicate that selection is not 
the cause but the result of biological organization. Therefore, 
ultimately, the flying instinct, together with the phenomenon of 
evolution, is based on the Bauer principle.  
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Philip Ball  
I think the example is clearer if we take a less emotive case: a 
bacterium released near a source of nutrient, to which it can find its 
way by chemotaxis.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
I repeat my answer given in the previous round: chemotaxis is 
already a biological input.  
 
Philip Ball  
One can design a robot, or most probably soon an artificial cell, to 
do that. It is all purely mechanical. 
 
Attila Grandpierre  
No, it is not mechanical, even not physical; ultimately, it is always 
the decision of the organism to decide to go for the food. Deciding 
to go for the food is prescribed not in a coercive manner like the 
laws of physics but depend on the autonomy of the organism, too. 
Biological decisions correspond to the most action principle. Once 
the autonomous organism decided to go for the food, the rest is 
physics, because the endpoint is decided, and so the most action 
principle requires the work on the basis of the least action principle 
in order to secure the most action possible for the organism. 
Therefore, the first principle of physics is derivable from the most 
action principle of biology.  
 
Philip Ball  
In nature, it’s surely now clear why the ‘watchmaker’ involved in 
‘design’ can be blind.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
I repeat: physics comes only after the biological endpoint is 
determined. One can close the eye only if it already selected what 
to do. 
 
(continued) 
Philip Ball  
“It is only evolution that has installed an apparent ‘purpose’ to it all.” 
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Attila Grandpierre  
Evolution acts only on the species and not on the individual. The trajectory of a 
fallen bird is not prescribed by evolution in all its details. Evolution cannot play 
the role of an absolute and rigid control of biological processes.  
 
Philip Ball  
Evolution nevertheless shaped all individuals in a species. And I’m not sure it’s 
true to say that evolution can’t explain the bird’s trajectory.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
Definitely, evolution acts only at the level of species, and cannot determine the 
trajectory of a concrete bird in all its details. Even in the same environment, the 
bird dropped from a height can fly to many directions and can select many 
different trajectories.  
 
Philip Ball  
Evolution can explain how the bird gets the instincts and apparatus for flying; 
the rest is mechanics.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
This claim can be stated only when ignoring the most fundamental aspect of 
biological organization, namely, biological endpoint selection. 
 
Philip Ball  
Yet it leads to the even stranger notion of a ‘biological vacuum’, which seems to 
me to be some agency that gives organisms biological foresight of the kind that 
evolution ensures they don’t actually need. 
 
Attila Grandpierre  
Evolution is a special aspect of biology. The theory of evolution has quite a 
different character from theoretical physics. The fundamental laws of physics 
are the most general laws of physical phenomena, while the theory of evolution 
considers only a special phenomenon, the evolution of species, and only within 
special conditions present in the Earth, and so it fundamentally lacks due 
generality. Biology will reach the position of a mature natural science only if it 
finds the most general laws of biological behavior. Once theoretical biology will 
develop, finding its first principle, it will be a more fundamental theory than the 
theory of evolution. Therefore, rejecting the possibility to consider the first 
principle of biology on the basis of sticking to a special theory has a corollary 
hindering the development of natural science (continued below). 
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Philip Ball  
I’m not sure I agree that evolutionary theory need be seen as a 
‘special case’ in biology, or that it precludes other views on 
biological behaviour, such as a systems view of the cell or 
explanations for group coordination.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
The fundamental equations of physics determine the most general 
laws of all possible physical objects. In contrast, evolutionary 
theory is not the theory of the most general laws of motion of all 
living organisms possible. It is only the theory of evolution of 
species of the biosphere present on the Earth. As it is not correct to 
claim that the semiempirical theory of the growth of the tree is the 
ultimate theory of the tree, it is also not correct to claim that the 
semiempirical theory of evolution is the ultimate theory of biology. 
 
(continued) 
Philip Ball  
Another claim for which I can’t find sufficient motivation is the idea that 
biological systems maximize action. This seems to depend on an assumption 
that organisms ‘try’ to live for as long as possible. But that isn’t so. They live 
for as long as is evolutionarily convenient. 
 
Attila Grandpierre  
Again, the subject of evolution is the species, and not the individual. In most 
cases it is an irresistible biological urge for the individual to survive, 
independently of its “evolutionary convenient” age. Even if Homo sapiens 
would have an evolutionary convenient life span, let us take 80 years, most older 
people still want to survive. (continued). 
 
Philip Ball  
Ultimately the average lifespan is determined by evolutionary 
factors, regardless of the fact that we have a survival instinct.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
Again, we have to distinguish between the level of biosphere, the 
level of a certain species and the level of a certain individual. The 
average lifespan of a species is determined at the level of the 
biosphere, which can be regarded also as a living organism; see 
Shapiro, R. 1998, Planetary Dreams. Therefore, the average 
lifetime of a species corresponds to the most action principle 
applied to the biosphere, to the longest lifespan of the biosphere. 
The same is true on the level of the individual, which also tries to 
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live in accordance with the most action principle applied to the 
individual. Apparently, Ball denies the aim of the individual to live 
as long and as healthy as possible on the basis of a consideration 
switching implicitly to a different context, from the individual to 
the species and the relations of species within the biosphere.  
 
Philip Ball  
Of course, humans might one day be able to subvert that 
technologically (probably to our cost), but we’re a special case!  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
I hope it is more clear now that I mean not a technological but a 
biological wish of maximizing survival and health, at the level of 
the individual.  
 
(continued) 
Moreover, the aim of survival only one of the essential aspects maximizing 
action, since the other factor is to reach the highest amount of available free 
energy (action=energy*time). Indeed, most living organisms strive not only for 
survival but for the healthy state in which the available free energy is maximal 
(continued below). 
 
Philip Ball  
Sounds rather like both stem from the same survival instinct.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
Not necessarily. There are two variables: maximal distance from 
equilibrium (E) and maximal lifespan (T). Action is roughly the 
product E*T (more precisely, ∫E(t)dt). Moreover, my chapter 
presents not a qualitative argument but a quantitative one 
formulated mathematically. This can be regarded as a definite 
achievement.  
 
(continued) 
Moreover, Ball considers only extreme cases in which the species and the 
individual are in conflict (continued below). 
 
Philip Ball  
In any event, the hypothesis of maximal action seems to be one 
that is asserted but never proved. 
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Attila Grandpierre  
As I stated in my chapter, Ervin Bauer (1920, 1935/1967; refs. in 
the chapter) already established the first principle of biology, 
proving that all the fundamental life phenomena like metabolism, 
growth, reproduction, regeneration and death can be derived from 
it. He also formulated the first principle of biology in a 
quantitative mathematical form, and made it suitable for 
calculations of biological processes. Moreover, my re-formulation 
of the Bauer principle in the form of most action principle is 
proven in Grandpierre, 2007, NeuroQuantology 5, 346-362.  
 
Philip Ball  
I confess that I’m not familiar with these works – I will need to 
take a look. 
 
(continued) 
Philip Ball  
At root, I am perhaps most perplexed by the notion that algorithmic complexity 
has to be high to account for biological phenomena. Has it not been one of the 
underpinnings of complexity science that complex behaviours can arise from 
simple rules? 
 
Attila Grandpierre  
This is a very good question, related to a main aspect of my chapter. Indeed, 
today it is a dominant view that complexity can arise from simple rules. But one 
must distinguish between the above weak form of such a statement and a 
stronger form claiming that all complexities found in nature must be derived 
from simple rules regulating only the physical properties of the systems and 
organisms. As I enlightened it in my chapter, algorithmic complexity has a 
fundamentally different nature from the morphological or phenomenological 
complexity. Let us take an example. The circle has a low algorithmic complexity 
(cca. 100 bits), and an extremely high morphological complexity (infinite points, 
infinite bits). Therefore, it is apparent that a small algorithmic complexity is able 
to produce an extremely high amount of morphological complexity. In this sense, 
algorithmic complexity is more fundamental than morphological one. Does it 
follow from the fact that the circle has a low algorithmic complexity that we 
must think that all the mathematical functions can be derived from simple rules? 
No, because, for example, there are many mathematical objects that cannot be 
given in algebraically closed form. Let us take another example. There are 
simple machines like a watch having a low algorithmic complexity. Does it 
follow that we must accept that all machines must have low algorithmic 
complexity? No, because a computer with higher algorithmic complexity can 
solve more tasks and more easily than a smaller computer. Moreover, once the 
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machine is ready, its functions are specified, its algorithmic complexity is given. 
But there are tasks for living organisms requiring revealing a problem, to realize 
the existence of an unexpected task. Living organisms must continuously solve 
new and new problems, and problem solving is by definition corresponds to the 
production of algorithmic complexity. Production of algorithmic complexity is 
possible only if a still deeper level of complexity (generative complexity) exists 
which can produce algorithmic complexity on the basis of a unified context 
corresponding to the generative principle. One of the main points of my chapter 
is to show that we must realize that algorithmic complexity and generative 
complexity can be regarded as full members of the conceptual framework of 
science and they are fundamental aspects of nature. My answer to Ball’s 
problem is that we have to consider systems and organisms with high 
algorithmic complexity. The algorithmic complexity of a circle or a fractal is 
low, a watch has a higher algorithmic complexity, a computer still higher, and a 
living organism still much higher. Indeed, the algorithmic complexity of a living 
organism must be high to account for biological phenomena (continued below). 
 
Philip Ball  
I need to give this more thought! All I’d say now is that our point 
of reference in such questions should in my view be a bacterium 
rather than any higher organism: to my mind, once you have the 
former, the latter follow…  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
There are more and more evidence indicating the existence of 
autonomous bacterial purpose and intelligence, like e.g. Mathieu 
and Sonea 1996, Time to drastically change the century-old 
concept about bacteria, Science Tribune, August 1996; Ben-Jacob, 
2003, Bacteria harnessing complexity. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. A, 
361, pp. 1283-1312; Ben Jacob, Aharonov and Shapira, 2005, 
Bacterial self-organization: co-enhancement of complexification 
and adaptability in a dynamic environment. Biofilms, 1, 239-263; 
http://star.tau.ac.il/~eshel/papers/11.11.04.pdf; di Primio, Müller, 
and Lengeler, 2000, Minimal Cognition in Unicellular Organism. 
SAB2000 Proceedings Supplement, International Society for 
Adaptive Behavior, 3-12,  
http://www.ais.fraunhofer.de/~diprimio/publications/diprimio_Min
Cog.pdf; Ben Jacob, E., Shapira, Y. and Tauber, A. I. 2006, 
Seeking the foundations of cognition in bacteria: from 
Schrödinger's negative entropy to latent information. Physica A 
359,  495–524; Shapiro, J. A. 2007, Bacteria are small but not 
stupid: cognition, natural genetic engineering and socio-
bacteriology. Stud. Hist. Phil. Biol. & Biomed. Sci. 38, 807-809; B. 
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J. Ford, 2004, Are cells ingenious? Microscope 52, 135-144; B. J. 
Ford, 2006, Revealing the ingenuity of the living cell. Biologist 53, 
221-224. 
 
(continued) 
Philip Ball  
Simple models of ant motion, driven by simple ideas such as chemotaxis and 
random searching, can reproduce the behaviour of ant colonies rather well. 
 
Attila Grandpierre  
Again, it seems that Ball thinks in a physical approach without realizing the 
difference represented in biological behavior. Definitely, when introducing 
biological concepts like chemotaxis, it is already possible at least in some simple 
cases to reproduce the observable behavior of ant colonies (but not so well of 
each individual ant, I guess). My biological approach intends to establish the 
idea that it is necessary to add suitable biological concepts to our physical 
vocabulary when attempting to determine biological behavior (see Grandpierre, 
2007, NeuroQuantology 5, 346-362.).  
 
Philip Ball  
For simple organisms such as bacteria, it seems even possible in principle that 
one might sense from moment to moment all the environmental influences 
acting on a single cell, and thereby predict its motion with great precision.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
Again, the difference arises in the approaches. Ball seems to stick to the physical 
approach corresponding to extremely short timescale changes “from moment to 
moment”. In the long run, in a long enough timescale, it is not possible to 
determine the behavior of a fallen bird in the absence of suitable biological 
endpoints (like chemotaxis, reaching the food, escaping from a danger etc.). 
Therefore, even if it would be possible to predict the behavior of a cell from 
moment to moment (like the position of a fallen bird in the next instant) 
approximately, it is not possible to determine the biological behavior of the cell 
on a purely physical basis on a biological timescale (the trajectory of a fallen 
bird deteriorating itself from the free fall path) (continued below). 
 
Philip Ball  
Hmm… I’m not sure I agree with the way the problem is posed, as 
though a complex biological entity like a bird can be compared 
with an inanimate particle.  
 
Attila Grandpierre 
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Attila Grandpierre  
The problem is posed in the framework of the Galileo experiment, 
considering the fall of different objects from the Pisa tower and 
watching their behavior. The behavior of the bird is compared not 
to that of an inanimate particle but of an inanimate thing. The 
problem is posed in accordance to the central task of science, 
namely, finding the laws of nature governing observable behavior.  
The laws of physics explain physical behavior. We must consider 
biological behavior in order to understand the nature of the 
biological principle. To understand the difference of biological 
principle from the physical one, we must compare the behavior of 
inanimate objects and living organisms.  
 
Philip Ball  
It is clear that organisms possess ‘motivations’, which means that 
their trajectories, while not violating Newtonian mechanics, can’t 
easily be deduced from that.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
It is not only the case that biological behavior “can’t easily be 
deduced from Newtonian mechanics”. The plain fact is that the 
most action principle cannot be derived from the least action 
principle, independently of trying easily or more systematically. 
The first principle of biology simply cannot be derived from the 
physical principle. The fundamental complexity measures I 
considered in my chapter underpin this fact quantitatively. Since 
the algorithmic complexity cannot be produced by physical 
processes, and because the laws of physics has an algorithmic 
complexity around 1 000 bits (see in my chapter), therefore the 
algorithmic complexity of biological organisms, being much 
higher than the 1 000 bits of physical laws, cannot be derived from 
physics.  
 
Philip Ball  
But I’m not clear why this should be a mystery that requires any 
principles beyond the ones we have already.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
On the contrary. Biological behavior is a mystery at present only 
when narrowing down our considerations to the framework of 
physics. This apparent mystery can be resolved on the basis of a 
principle which is published more than eighty years ago by Ervin 
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Bauer, which is, unfortunately, still ignored. So we do not require 
any principles beyond the ones we have already.  
 
Philip Ball  
Why doesn’t evolution alone suffice to provide the imperatives 
and mechanisms, which are then acted out in particular situations 
and contexts by particular organisms?  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
The evolution of species is merely a historical process of special, 
namely, earthly life forms and it should not be taken as the most 
fundamental biological process. The most fundamental biological 
processes are the ones corresponding to the most action principle, 
which are the virtual interactions generating biological couplings 
between exergonic, energy liberating and endergonic, energy 
requiring processes. Evolution is like the growth of the tree. 
Similarly, the growth of the tree is not the fundamental life process 
of the tree. Cellular biochemical activity, the biological couplings 
governed by the most action principle, and the virtual interactions 
manifesting the most action principle are more fundamental 
biological processes. Growth of the tree is the result of cellular 
activity and not the other way around. One cannot explain cellular 
biochemical reactions in terms of growth of the tree. The 
“biological imperatives” arise ultimately not from evolution and 
selection pressure, but from biological organization governed by 
the Bauer principle. 
 
(continued) 
Philip Ball  
Grandpierre argues that abiogenesis cannot seem to create, in a sufficiently short 
time, the complexity we see in life: if I understand correctly, he implies that only 
life (or ‘intelligence’) can beget life. To my mind, there are two shortcomings 
with this. First, it assumes that accumulation of complexity is linear, whereas it 
now seems that many complex systems possess thresholds above which entirely 
new modes of behaviour – new capabilities – appear. 
 
Attila Grandpierre  
Actually, I argued in my chapter that the accumulation of complexity can be 
faster in living organisms than in abiotic systems. Moreover, one of the main 
results of my paper is that I determined quantitatively the rate of complexity 
upjumps from abiotic systems to the first simple living organisms, and the 
complexity upjumps from the smallest bacteria to humans. The results tell that 
the complexity upjump assumed in the hypothetical abiogenesis during a period 
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less than hundred million years is larger than the complexity upjump during the 
four billion years of biological evolution. I argued that this result makes the 
assumption of abiogenesis improbable. 
 
Philip Ball  
As I understand it, this is consistent with my claim that, once you have a 
bacterium, all the rest (up to humans) follows. I agree that the origin of life is a 
huge step in increase of complexity. But I’m not sure that we should necessarily 
have any expectations about whether life, once begun, would maintain a 
comparable rate of increase in complexity. Bacteria and other single-celled 
organisms are extremely successful; humans are anomalies. Work like that of 
Stuart Kauffman at least claims to show that, once you have autocatalytic cycles, 
you have the basic ingredients of ‘life’ in place.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
Autocatalytic cycles when coupled together into an integrated unit form an 
automaton. Organisms are much more than automata since they are able to 
reorganize themselves by biological organization. It follows that biological 
organization is not the result of autocatalytic cycles but is the cause of 
organizing such cycles, together with ingenious reactions, into a living organism. 
Indeed, bacterial autonomy, motivations and significant achievements (see the 
references indicated above) show the profound significance of non-mechanically 
repeated biological reactions.  
 
Philip Ball  
In any event, I’m not sure we understand the processes that lead to a living 
organism well enough yet to be able to make convincing claims about how 
‘unlikely’ abiogenesis is. 
 
Attila Grandpierre  
The argument presented in my chapter is a quantitative one which is more close 
to the norms of established science than opinions which did not reach the phase 
of quantitative arguments.  
 
Philip Ball  
Hence my comment below: it seems you are introducing a new idea/process 
largely because we don’t yet have enough understanding to bridge the gap on 
the basis of established ideas, rather than because there is any clear empirical 
demand for it.  
 
Attila Grandpierre  
There are arguments indicating that complexity science is the next frontier of 
natural sciences as well as arguments telling that the 21st century is the century 
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of biology. Unfortunately, it seems that both complexity science and theoretical 
biology lacks its exact base which could be comparable to the exact base of 
physics. In my chapter I tried to introduce fundamental measures of complexity. 
I found that besides the complexity we observe with our eyes (morphologic or 
phenomenal complexity) there exist a fundamentally different level of 
complexity which is already known as algorithmic complexity. I tried to show 
that genetic complexity, which is a static thing, represents a still deeper level of 
complexity. I argued that biological organization has a complexity 
corresponding to the genetic level of complexity, but, at variance with genetic 
complexity characterized by the number of non-coding base pairs, biological 
organization represents a form of activity. With the help of these fundamental 
complexity measures I tried to obtain new light on the difference between 
machines and organisms. I hope I succeeded to make some steps towards a 
quantitative theory of biological organization and show the possibility of putting 
complexity sciences and theoretical biology to a more firm basis. Actually, there 
is a whole list of experimental data and theoretical underpinnings indicating the 
increasingly vital need for a realistic complexity science and theoretical biology 
(given in Grandpierre, 2007, NeuroQuantology 5, 346-362.). Therefore, I did 
not introduce a mystic new factor to fill the gaps of our present knowledge. 
Instead, my approach explains biological behavior on the most fundamental, 
exact and elegant way possible, since the most action principle of biology and 
the least action principle of physics form a natural union: the general action 
principle.  
 
Philip Ball  
To my mind, “intelligence in Nature” here becomes another God of the gaps. 
 
Attila Grandpierre  
To my mind, the first principle of physics is not another God of the gaps. It is 
quantitative, predictive, and consistent with our best and broadest theories and 
the widest range of established empirical facts. Similarly, the biological first 
principle is also quantitative, predictive, it is the best and broadest biological 
theory, consistent with the theoretical biology of Ervin Bauer, and with a large 
body of yet unexplained facts that it can explain. This is science and not religion. 
In the twenty-first century more and more biological data are accumulated. In 
the absence of a general theoretical biology, there is an increasing frustration 
between millions of biologists (Brent and Bruck, 2006, Nature 440, 416).  
Recently, biological physics became a new frontier of natural sciences (Phillips 
and Quake 2006, Physics Today 2006; 59(5): 38-43.; Sung, 2006, Crossroads: 
Journal of Asia Pacific Center for Theoretical Physics 2006; 4: 1-3.). Biological 
physics is the interdisciplinary effort to cross the barriers between physics and 
biology from the biology side (Sung, 2006). The US National Science 
Foundation allocates billions of dollars year by year for initiating the birth of 
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theoretical biological physics (Ladik, 2004, Journal of Molecular Structure 
2004; 673: 59-64.). “Promoting research that encourages a holistic perspective 
to “understand complex systems” is a long-term investment priority in the 
strategic plan of the National Science Foundation of the United States” (Hübler, 
2007, Complexity 12, No. 5, 9). The fundamental complexity measures of nature 
introduced in our chapter serves both needs simultaneously.  
 
I think it is time to realize the need for a realistic theoretical biology and 
complexity science.  
 
Philip Ball  
“I think it is time to realize the need for a realistic theoretical biology and 
complexity science.” I completely agree! 
 
 
